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Abstract 
Financial markets generally, and the spot foreign exchange market in particular, are reputed 
to  be  excessively  volatile.  Previous  research  has  linked  this  excess  volatility  to  private 
information.  This  article  re-examines  the  theory  and  challenges  that  link.  Empirical 
evidence suggests that random variation between buy and sell volumes is a more important 
driver  than  private  information  in  the  spot  foreign  exchange  market.  The  paper  also 
develops theoretical propositions for the relationships between key market variables on an 
intraday basis. High frequency data is used to examine the role of private information in 
explaining well documented intraday patterns that persist in the time series of a number of 
trade related variables, including return volatility. 
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1.  Introduction 
Flood and Rose (1995) report that the increase in foreign exchange (FX) rate volatility 
following  the  collapse  of  the  Bretton  Woods  system  of  fixed  exchange  rates  was  not 
accompanied by a corresponding increase in the volatility of the macroeconomic variables 
that are believed to drive exchange rates. It is this argument more than any other that gives 
exchange rates the sobriquet of excessively volatile. French and Roll (1986) forged a link 
between excessive volatility in the stock market and private information. Their analysis is 
based on periods of unscheduled closure. Ito, Lyons and Melvin (1998) were presented with 
an opportunity to study a similar unscheduled closure phenomenon in the FX market. Their 
conclusion matched that of French and Roll (1986), i.e. that private information must be the 
catalyst for the observed excessive volatility. 
 
The central focus of the present paper is the link between private information and excessive 
volatility, but in a different setting. Instead of analysing periods of unscheduled closure, our 
setting is the trading day. The paper presents a new and unusually rich spot FX dataset of 
global inter-dealer electronic transactions, which enables us to undertake a fresh empirical 
investigation  of  one  of  the  most  important  puzzles  in  finance:  why  are  exchange  rates 
reputed to be excessively volatile?  
 
Aside from the central question of private information and excessive volatility, this analysis 
is  important  because  the  spot  FX  market  has  previously  been  underrepresented  in  the 
literature  on  intraday  regularities  due  to  difficulties  in  obtaining  data.  We  examine  the 
widely  observed  empirical  regularities  in  intraday  return  volatility,  bid-ask  spreads  and 
volume, and extend prior literature by investigating intraday order flow. Evans and Lyons 
(2002) define order flow as “the net of buyer-initiated and seller-initiated orders” and state 
that “it is a measure of net buying pressure”. These authors argue that order flow is driven 
by (private) information and they provide strong evidence to show that order flow is the 
proximate driver of price in the spot FX market. Specifically, they show that cumulative 
order  flow  is  highly  correlated  with  cumulative  price  change.  If  order  flow  is  the 
manifestation of informed trading activity then order flow should have a measurably strong 
effect on bid-ask spreads. Volume is also widely acknowledged as having close links with 
bid-ask spreads.  
   2 
A general theory which can explain the relationships between the well documented intraday 
regularities in a variety of trade related variables should be able to shed light on what drives 
both prices and bid-ask spreads. Many theories have been put forward to explain both the 
observed phenomena and the relationships between them. The most common theme across 
these is based on private information. For the first time, we bring this group of theories 
together and unify them into a coherent and internally-consistent network of hypotheses. In 
doing so, we find that the impact of informed trading on volatility is misspecified in one of 
the  core  models  and  has  subsequently  been  widely  misunderstood.  We  develop  new 
hypotheses  on  the  relationship  between  informed  trading  and  volatility.  We  use  a 
correlation  matrix  in  testing  our  multiple  contemporaneous  hypotheses,  and  examine 
whether these relationships under investigation have changed since the introduction of the 
euro. Finally, we reveal the importance of asymmetric information in explaining observed 
intraday regularities in the four key variables mentioned above. 
 
Understanding  intraday  regularities  is  important  for  market  participants,  regulators  and 
researchers. It can help traders identify the most/least advantageous times of the day to 
trade. It is important for policy makers and enforcers to better understand market events, in 
order to formulate and implement effective regulation. Empiricists also need to take account 
of seasonal effects, as this can be a source of bias in other analyses. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the prior theoretical 
and empirical literature, and Section 3 draws together the various strands of theory and 
expounds a set of broad hypotheses about market relationships. Section 4 explains the data 
and methodology, and Section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2.  Literature Review 
2.1  Theoretical Background 
Two broad sets of theoretical models exist which seek to explain the intraday behaviour of 
key financial market variables. The first argues that private or asymmetric information is a 
central factor, as market agents strategically optimise their trading behaviour to minimise 
trading costs and  the  market impact of  their trades. The second focuses on  the role  of 
market structure, suggesting that these patterns are incidental and occur because of longer 
horizon strategic behaviour of traders.   3 
 
The asymmetric information argument can be traced back to Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) 
who extend Kyle’s (1984) model to explain intraday phenomena. Their central argument is 
that volume patterns emerge because informed and uninformed traders choose to trade at 
the same time in order to minimise transactions costs. Rejecting the Admati and Pfleiderer 
(1988)  explanation  as  insufficient  to  fully  explain  empirical  observations,  Brock  and 
Kleidon (1992) make the case that traders have different optimal holding portfolios when 
the market is closed from when the market is open. They argue that volumes are larger at 
the  open  and  close  because  of  portfolio  rebalancing.  While  the  Admati  and  Pfleiderer 
(1988) and Brock and Kleidon (1992) models focus on different explanations of volume, it 
is important to note that their predictions do not entirely contradict each other. It is possible 
that the drivers identified in both models could combine in the overall result. 
 
Brock and Kleidon (1992) predict a U-shaped intra-day pattern in bid-ask spreads if market 
makers have some degree of monopoly power. They argue that this is a natural response to 
increased order flow at the open and close. More precisely, they argue that it is two different 
natural responses. At the open, market makers maintain wide bid-ask spreads because they 
fear they could be adversely selected by traders who know more than they do, before they 
can get a firm estimate of the true price level. At the close, they maintain wide bid-ask 
spreads  in  an  attempt  to  avoid  exposing  themselves  to  the  risk  of  holding  unwanted 
inventory positions over the closed period. The monopoly power assumption is necessary 
because in a perfectly competitive market, market makers would always compete the bid-
ask spread down to the minimum level. 
 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) address the issue of transaction costs indirectly, in the form of 
the Kyle- ZKLFKPHDVXUHVPDUNHWPDNHUV¶SULFHVHQVLWLYLW\LHDYHUVLRQWRRUGHUIORZ
Their model shows that the Kyle- LVH[SHFWHGWREHORZHUDWWLPHVRIKLJKYROXPH,WFRXOG
be interpreted from this that market makers will put up bid-ask spreads when they are more 
averse  to order  flow but  Admati and  Pfleiderer (1988)  do not  make  this explicit. Kyle 
GHILQHV DVWKHLQYHUVHRIPDUNHt depth. Empirical work by Lee et al (1993), Ahn et 
al (1999) and Danielsson and Payne (2001) demonstrate that bid-ask spreads and depth are 
negatively related. While other literature (e.g. Harris (1994), Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000) 
and Jones and Lipson (2001)) reports that narrower spreads coincide with less depth, those 
findings  all  relate  to  markets  in  which  the  price  resolution  or  minimum  tick  size  has   4 
changed. Absent such changes in price granularity, the evidence indicates that the Kyle- 
should be positively related to bid-ask spreads, which implies that the bid-ask spread should 
narrow  as  volume  rises.  For  markets  that  close  overnight,  this  means  that  a  U-shaped 
volume pattern should be accompanied by an inverted-U-shaped bid-ask spread pattern. 
Brock and Kleidon (1992) take issue with the latter prediction because it does not match 
empirical observations. Bid-ask spreads are consistently observed to be U-shaped over the 
trading day, not inverted-U-shaped. 
 
Subrahmanyam  (1991)  extends  the  Admati  and  Pfleiderer  (1988)  model  by  allowing 
informed traders, who had been risk neutral, to become risk averse and so, enables high 
volumes and wide bid-ask spreads to co-exist. However, in so doing, the motivation for 
volume  to  concentrate  at  certain  times  of  day  (a  central  argument  of  the  Admati  and 
Pfleiderer (1988) model) is lost. This happens because risk averse informed traders would 
trade  more  during  high  volume  periods  than  risk  neutral  informed  traders.  Increased 
informed trading increases adverse selection risk causing high volume trading costs to rise, 
with  the  result  that  discretionary  liquidity  traders  no  longer  wish  to  trade  alongside 
informed traders. 
 
The  conventional  measure  of  return  in  intraday  market  microstructure  studies  is  price 
change volatility or, more precisely, the across-day variance of successive price changes 
over each time segment. This volatility measure concentrates on the magnitude of returns 
associated with a particular time of day because price changes can be both positive and 
negative. Thus, high return volatility in a particular time segment reveals the presence of 
extreme price moves at that time of day. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) make the case that as 
informed trading kicks in, price change (i.e. volatility) rises. Subsequently, most empirical 
researchers ascribe to the Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) model that volume and volatility 
move in the same direction. However, as we discuss in detail below, this interpretation of 
their model is questionable. 
 
Other researchers contend that private information explains the observed relationship of 
volume  and  volatility.  Copeland  (1976)  and  Jennings,  Starks  and  Fellingham  (1981) 
develop models based on sequential information arrival. Here, an individual trader receives 
a signal ahead of the market and trades on it, thereby creating volume and moving price (i.e. 
creating volatility). Hence, volatility and volume move in the same direction.    5 
 
French and Roll (1986) consider three alternative explanations for the observed positive 
relationship between volume and volatility: (1) Relevant public announcements are made 
primarily during trading hours and so affect price at that time; (2) errors in pricing rise 
linearly with volume; and (3) some traders may be trading on private information which is 
either  not  available  or  can  not  be  exploited  in  quiet  times. By  ruling  out  the first  two 
explanations, they conclude that informed trading must be the source of the excess volatility 
they  observed  in  the  periods  when  the  market  was  continuously  open.  Ito,  Lyons  and 
Melvin (1998) applied this model to the Tokyo spot FX market over a period during which 
a ban on lunchtime trading was lifted. Echoing French and Roll (1986), they found that 
volatility doubled when trading was permitted at lunchtime. 
 
While Brock and Kleidon (1992) do not focus on  volatility, other researchers use non-
private  information  arguments  to  explain  why  volatility  is  observed  to  have  the  same 
intraday pattern as volume. The main theory here is Clark’s (1973) Mixture of Distributions 
Hypothesis (MDH), which argues that volatility and volume move together in response to a 
common unobservable external stimulus, deemed to be information flow. The arrival of 
news pushes both volume and volatility (a measure of absolute price adjustment) in the 
same direction. Later researchers have elaborated on this idea. Epps and Epps (1976) link 
intraday volatility to disparate opinions among traders following a price signal. Tauchen 
and Pitts (1983) develop the disparate opinion among traders model more formally. They 
propose a bivariate mixture model in which volume and price change are jointly distributed 
due to the presence of a latent variable. This model shows the covariance between volume 
and price change as zero, while the covariance between volume and price change volatility 
is positive, which is what has been commonly observed empirically.  
 
Other models based on private information, which relate the bid-ask spread to volume and 
volatility,  exist  outside  of  the  specifically  intraday  pattern  models.  A  significant 
contribution by Easley and O’Hara (1992) suggests that volume is in itself important for 
price and bid-ask spread determination. In their words: “absent abnormal volume, prices do 
not move”. Their central message is that “no-trades” convey information too, in that an 
information event should be followed by a trade. The absence of trades conveys to market 
makers that an information event has probably not occurred, thereby decreasing adverse 
selection risk. This in turn should decrease the bid-ask spread. The upshot of this argument   6 
is that unanticipated volume, which monotonically reveals the level of informed trading, 
should  be  positively  correlated  with  the  bid-ask  spread.  According  to  Cornell  (1978), 
anticipated volume should be negatively related to the bid-ask spread because of economies 
of scales, competition among market makers and inventory management opportunities. 
 
An important factor that we utilise below is order flow or, more specifically, the across-day 
volatility of order flow. Order flow is defined as buyer volume minus seller volume. We 
were unable to find any theoretical literature which addressed intraday order flow directly. 
 
One feature to be borne in mind is that most of the above models are based in markets 
which can be modelled in the Kyle (1984, 1985) tradition. Specifically, designated market 
makers are involved in the price setting and bid-ask spread setting processes. However, 
under electronic order driven systems, there are no designated market makers. Any trader 
can choose to execute his trade via a limit or a market order. As a result, price and bid-ask 
spread  behaviour  may  be  very  different.  However,  for  the  purposes  of  exposition,  we 
continue to use the term “market maker” throughout this paper. For the moment, in the 
context of order driven markets, we define the term as “the abstract, nebulous means by 
which liquidity is provided to the market”. This function should still cause bid-ask spreads 
to widen when there is a risk of adverse selection. However, inventory imbalances should 
be less of a problem. Furthermore, if informed traders can choose between market orders 
and limit orders, and do so in response to environmental conditions, it may be difficult to 
distinguish buys from sells in the ex-post order flow. Although the trader does not switch 
between  being  a  buyer  or  a  seller,  it  is  the  behaviour  of  the  aggressor  in  a  trade  that 
determines whether the trade is a buy or a sell. This problem could make any model which 
is reliant on signed order flow difficult to evaluate. 
 
Models specified on order driven markets are important for the present study because the 
dataset under analysis derives from an order driven regime. Although there is a general 
dearth of theoretical research devoted to order driven markets, a number of important papers 
have emerged. Glosten (1994) develops a model where limit order traders are uninformed 
and risk-neutral. Market order traders are comprised of both risk-neutral uninformed traders 
and risk-averse informed traders. He finds that the bid-ask spread is positively related to the 
level  of  informed  trading  because  large  orders  are  more  likely  to  come from  informed 
traders. Harris (1998) examines order placement in a variety of market conditions and finds   7 
that informed traders’ preference for market over limit orders is positively related to volume 
and negatively related to bid-ask spreads. Foucault (1999) presents a sequential, dynamic, 
one-period model of limit and market order placement in which market participants have 
diverse opinions about asset valuations. He finds that the propensity to place market rather 
than limit orders decreases with volatility. However, in volatile periods, many of these limit 
orders arrive at uncompetitive prices, resulting in a high proportion of these being unfilled. 
He also finds that bid-ask spreads are positively related to volatility. 
 
In summary, there are different but not always contradictory theories for observed intraday 
volume patterns. On the one hand, it may be the case that traders rebalance their portfolio 
when switching between different market states, e.g. open and closed. On the other hand, 
the observed patterns may result from informed and uninformed traders trading alongside 
each  other.  Intraday  bid-ask  spread  patterns  may  arise  because  market makers  exercise 
monopoly power in the face of higher volumes. Alternatively, bid-ask spreads may widen in 
response to unanticipated volumes and fall in response to anticipated volumes. Price change 
volatility may be positively related to informed trading or it may be linked to disagreement 
between traders about the true price. Unanticipated volume is associated with informed 
trading, as is volatility, but in different ways. The market making function is very different 
in order-driven markets, compared with quote driven ones. Most notably, traders can switch 
from  the  market  side  to  the  limit  side  of  an  order  without  switching  their  buy  or  sell 
intention. Recent work has shown that bid-ask spreads should still widen in response to 
informed trading under order driven regimes and also that bid-ask spreads should still widen 
with volatility. In addition, theorists have found that both high volatility and wide bid-ask 
spreads  lead  informed  traders  to  choose  limit  orders  over  market  orders,  whereas  high 
volume has the opposite effect.  
 
2.2  Previous Empirical Evidence 
An  overwhelming  number  of  empirical  papers  have  documented  U-shaped  patterns  in 
intraday data for a wide range of variables. A U-shaped intraday pattern in bid-ask spreads 
is found in futures markets by Ma et al (1992), Wang et al (1994), Abhyankar et al (1995), 
and Ding (1999). In contrast, Franses et al (1997) find a flat distribution of bid-ask spreads 
across the day for the LIFFE Bund future. U-shaped intraday equity bid-ask spreads are 
reported  by  McInish  and  Wood  (1992),  Brock  and  Kleidon  (1992),  Lee  et  al  (1993),   8 
Lehmann  and  Modest  (1994),  Chan,  Chung  and  Johnson  (1995),  Werner  and  Kleidon 
(1996), Abhyankar et al (1997), Brockman and Chung (1998), Ahn et al (1999), Levin and 
Wright (1999) and Madhavan et al (1997). Shifting the focus to order driven markets, Chan, 
Christie and Schultz (1995) find that Nasdaq bid-ask spreads are flat throughout the day and 
tail off significantly at the close. Danielsson and Payne (2001) find a W-shaped pattern in 
USD/DEM bid-ask spreads for the 24-hour inter-dealer spot FX market. 
 
Many studies address the issue of intraday volumes or number of trades. Ekman (1992) and 
DeJong and Donders (1998) find a U-shaped intraday pattern in the number of trades in 
futures markets. A U-shaped intraday volume pattern is found in futures markets by Gannon 
(1994), Abhyankar et al (1995), ap Gwilym et al (1996), Franses et al (1997), Buckle et al 
(1998),  Piccinato  et  al  (1998)  and  Tse  (1999).  A  U-shaped  intraday  pattern  in  equity 
volumes  is  reported  by  Jain  and  Joh  (1988),  McInish  and  Wood  (1990),  Stephan  and 
Whaley (1990), Gerety and Mulherin (1992), Foster and Viswanathan (1993), Lee et al 
(1993),  Niemeyer  and  Sandas  (1993),  Lehmann  and  Modest  (1994),  Atkins  and  Basu 
(1995), Chan, Chung and Johnson (1995), Werner and Kleidon (1996), and Madhavan et al 
(1997). Abhyankar et al (1997) find an M-shaped volume pattern for UK stocks. In relation 
to  order  driven  markets,  U-shaped  intraday  volume  is  reported  by  Chan,  Christie  and 
Schultz (1995) for Nasdaq stocks. Danielsson and Payne (2001) find an M-shaped volume 
pattern  for  USD/DEM  spot  exchange  rate  on  Reuters  global  inter-dealer  FX  trading 
platform. 
 
Researchers have found compelling empirical evidence of the same U-shaped pattern in the 
intraday volatility of price changes. This is reported in futures markets by Kawaller et al 
(1990), Froot et al (1990), Cheung and Ng (1990), Chan et al (1991), Ekman (1992), Ito and 
Lin (1992), Becker et al (1993), Gannon (1994), Lee and Linn (1994), Wang et al (1994), 
Chang et al (1995), Daigler (1997), Franses et al (1997), Kofman and Martens (1997), 
Buckle  et  al  (1998),  and  Tse  (1999).  U-shaped  intraday  volatility  in  equity  markets  is 
reported by McInish and Wood (1990), Gerety and Mulherin (1992), Lehmann and Modest 
(1994), Werner and Kleidon (1996) and Abhyankar et al (1997). In order driven markets, 
Andersen and Bollerslev (1997) found a W-shaped pattern for S&P 500 futures. Hiraki et al 
(1995) found a reverse L shape for the Nikkei futures. Chan, Christie and Schultz (1995) 
find the U-shaped volume on Nasdaq. In the spot FX market, Baillie and Bollerslev (1990) 
find that volatility for the major currency pairs peaks twice during the day, when London   9 
and New York open, yielding an M-shaped plot. Low and Muthuswamy (1996) find similar 
peaks in price change volatility for three major currency pairs when London and New York 
open and close. Hseih and Kleidon (1996) and Docking et al (1999) find the same result for 
the USD/DEM.  
 
Like the theoretical literature, the intraday empirical literature neglects the role of order 
flow. With the notable exception of the spot foreign exchange examples, the predominant 
finding  from  the empirical  literature  is  that  bid-ask  spreads,  volumes  and  price  change 
volatility all exhibit a U-shaped intraday pattern. Both bid-ask spreads and volumes appear 
to rise at the open and the close of the market. Such patterns might not be found in the 
present study. The spot FX data utilized is from a 24-hour global market and so does not 
have an open or close per se. Although peaks may coincide with the London/New York 
open/close, it is anticipated that the specific prior spot FX findings will be more relevant to 
our analysis than the commonly reported U-shaped observations. 
 
Bessembinder (1994) and Jorion (1996) test the idea that expected and unexpected volume 
affect bid-ask spreads in opposite ways, using data on FX futures. Hartmann (1998) tests the 
same relationships on inter-dealer spot USD/JPY volumes. Danielsson and Payne (2001) 
apply  the  expected-unexpected  split  to  high-frequency  inter-dealer  spot  USD/DEM 
volumes. All find evidence supporting the Easley and O’Hara (1992) argument. 
 
3.  A Unified Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical approach underlying the analysis that follows is based on the asymmetric 
information explanation for intraday empirical regularities. The Brock and Kleidon (1992) 
approach would not be appropriate for analysing the spot FX market because this market is 
24-hour/global  and  therefore  does  not  have  daily  open  and  close  events  per  se. 
Consequently, the initial premise that these researchers tackle, the U-shaped pattern, does 
not exist in this market (see Danielsson and Payne (2001)). The latter paper also documents 
that bid-ask spreads and volumes have opposing patterns, while their patterns are usually 
aligned in other financial markets.  
 
Another justification for concentrating on asymmetric information rather than the market 
structure argument is that inventory risk is observed to be generally much lower in the spot   10 
FX  markets  compared  with  the  more  widely  studied  equity  markets.  Lyons  (2001) 
witnessed that a “large bank dealer in the USD/DEM market that [he] tracked in 1992 
finished his trading day with no net position within each of the five days in the sample, 
despite trading over $1 billion each day. Within the day, the half-life of the gap between his 
current  position  and  zero  was  only  ten  minutes”.  In  contrast,  Hasbrouck  and  Sofianos 
(1993)  and  Madhavan and  Smidt  (1993)  find  that  it  takes  NYSE  specialists a  week  to 
achieve the same outcome. For reasons discussed above, the inventory factor should be less 
important under order-driven regimes. 
 
Drawing together the various strands of theory, but with particular emphasis on Admati and 
Pfleiderer (1988), we form a number of hypotheses set out below. In doing this, an issue 
was identified with Admati and Pfleiderer’s (1988) volume-volatility relationship. Much 
empirical work which draws on this theory ascribes a positive volume-volatility relationship 
to it. However, Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) actually state the following about price change 
volatility: (a) it rises at the transition point when informed trading volume kicks in; (b) it 
falls  at  the  transition  point  when  informed  trading  subsides;  and  (c)  it  is  constant 
everywhere else. In their own words, “when the number of informed traders is greater in the 
later period, [price change volatility rises]. This is because more information is revealed in 
the later period than in the earlier one. When the number of informed traders decreases from 
one period to the next, [price change volatility falls], since more information is revealed in 
the earlier period”. Their conclusion on the non-transition trading periods is revealed in 
Proposition 3, where they state that, “…the variance of price changes is the same when n 
informed traders trade in each period as it is when there is no informed trading…..With 
some informed traders, the market gets information earlier than it otherwise would, but the 
overall rate at which information comes to the market is unchanged.”  
 
However, this idea that order flow has no impact on price change volatility just because it 
does not reduce the total amount of information is flawed. It is only true if foresight is both 
perfect and free, which these authors do not assume. Indeed, such an assumption would be 
inconsistent with any variation in the number of informed traders which is central to their 
model. At the core of this issue, is the conceptual relationship between order flow and the 
price change process. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) define their price innovation process as 
a martingale. Therefore, it follows  that successive price innovations can  have  opposing 
signs. This allows order flow to counteract the prevailing price innovation and reduce the   11 
price  change.  As  we  illustrate  below,  the  relationship  between  volume  and  volatility 
actually implied by this model, turns out to be the opposite of that usually inferred. 
 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) use the price generating process from Kyle (1984): 
 
0
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Equation 1: The Kyle price formation equation 
 
The current price, Pt is made up of a starting value P0, the sum of price innovations,  , since 
the start and current order flow,  t, multiplied by a coefficient,  , which reflects market 
maker  aversion  to  order  flow.    is  always  positive.  Order  flow  is  driven  by  private 
information about the next price innovation  t+1, and also by the expected transaction cost, 
given by  . Price changes in this model are defined as: 
 
1 1 1 t t t t t t t t R P P d l w lw - - - = - = - +  
Equation 2: Price changes in the Kyle model  
 
In this  price change definition,  the first component of the price change,  , is  the  price 
innovation for the current trading period. The second term captures earlier price movement 
caused  by  prior  predictions  of  .  These  two  terms  together  comprise  the  residual  or 
unexploited current price innovation. The last term is a price disturbance predicting the next 
price innovation.  
 
The  Kyle  (1984)  framework  contains  an  implicit  relationship,  which  is  important  for 
understanding the relationship between volume and price change volatility - price change 
does not simply depend on either   or  , but, rather, on how these two interact. For a given 
price signal,   and   are solely and inversely determined by the expected value of the other. 
If   is anticipated to rise,   should fall, such that just enough   is put through to exhaust the 
price  signal.  If  increased  volume  should  cause  the  general  level  of    to  rise,  it  is 
accompanied by a fall in  , such that no more than the price signal feeds through to price 
change. If each fully anticipates the other, then any point,  , on the curve in Figure 1 will 
fully exhaust the price signal and fully convey it to price change. Given this, the focus shifts   12 
to how informative the price signal actually is. If the price signal carries no information then 
  is  zero  and  price  change  volatility  is  simply  the  variance  of  ,  var(   At  the  other 
extreme, if foresight is perfect and costless, then, for any given  , order flow rises to fully 
capture each price innovation. This causes the first two terms in the price change equation 
above to cancel out and the third term to equal  t+1. In other words, the price innovation is 
shifted in time by one period and price change volatility is again var( ). However, var( ) is 
only preserved in these extremes. As the following equation shows, order flow will erode 
var( ) at all intermediate points:  
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Equation 3: Price change volatility with informed trading in the Kyle model  
 
This equation shows that price change volatility is composed of the residual, or unexploited, 
component of dt (=d- ), the forecast part of dt+1 (= ), plus the interaction between the 
two. Since   is constant within each regime, the variance of the forecast part of dt+1 can also 
be modelled as the forecast part of the variance, where   is the portion of dt+1 revealed by 
t. This relationship is exposed in the following identity: 
 
1 1
2 2 2 2
t t t t lw jd d s s j s
+ + º º  
Equation 4: The variance of the part of dt+1 revealed at time t by informed trading 
 
Similarly, the residual part of the variance can be modelled as 
2 2 (1 )
t d j s - . This form of the 
equation reveals that the interaction part depends on the first order autocorrelation of the d   13 
time series, 
1 , t t d d r
+ . However, Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) assume that d is independent 
and  identically  distributed  (IID).  In  other  words,  under  Admati  and  Pfleiderer’s  (1988) 
assumptions, price change volatility is: 
 
1
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Equation 5: Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) assume 
1 , t t d d r
+  is 0. 
 
In an example where the price signal captures 50% of the next price innovation (i.e.  =0.5), 
order flow will erode 50% of the current price innovation, thus reducing that component of 
price change volatility. However, contemporaneous order flow relating to dt+1 provides an 
additional  source  of  price  change  volatility.  As  these  two  are  uncorrelated,  there  is  no 
interaction component in the aggregate price change. If var(  is equal to 1, price change 
volatility will equal 0.5
2, from the unforecast part of dt , plus 0.5
2, from the forecast part of 
dt+1,  which  together  sum  to  0.5.  In  fact,  in  the  absence  of  autocorrelation,  50%  price 
informativeness  produces  the  minimum  possible  price  change  volaWLOLW\ RI YDUò  $OO
other levels of informativeness nudge price change volatility towards one of the extremes of 
QRLQIRUPDWLRQRUIXOOLQIRUPDWLRQZKHUHLWUHYHUWVWRYDU )LJXUHpresents a visual 
representation of this example. 
 
Figures 3 and 4 also help to convey the intuition at the heart of this issue. They depict a 
stylised  framework  where  successive  price  moves  are  perfectly  negatively  correlated. 
Figure 3 shows how price evolves over time as successively good and bad news is released 
about an asset. Price is revised up, then down, then back up, etc. in response to each of these 
news events. This scenario assumes no informed trading activity. Figure 4 considers the 
same situation with informed trading. The central insight from this figure is that for private 
information to have any real meaning, it must be linked to a future public information event. 
The early release of price pressure in period t not only takes away price pressure from 
period t+1, but also counteracts an opposite price action in period t.   
 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) introduce the assumptions of a fixed information acquisition 
cost and only two states for  .   is assumed to be low during high volume periods and high 
during  low  volume  periods.  Information  is  now  only  acquired  when  it  can  be  fully   14 
exploited, i.e. when   is low. So, when   is high,   should go to zero and price change 
volatility reverts to var( ). In the model, the latter should happen during low volume trading 
periods. Since foresight is not assumed to be perfect, price change volatility should fall 
below var( ) when informed traders are active. Even if foresight is perfect, the cost of 
information acquisition will require that informed traders make a profit, in which case they 
will not fully exhaust the price signal, again indicating that price change volatility should be 
below var( ). In reality, it is hard to envisage circumstances where price would consistently 
convey  more  than  50%  of  dt+1.  As  such,  the  negative  volume-volatility  relationship 
described by the left half of the curve in Figure 2 seems far more plausible than the positive 
one described by the right hand half. In any case, in the Admati and Pfleiderer(1988) model, 
informed  traders  are  only  active  during  high  volume  trading  periods.  Therefore,  price 
change volatility is the full var( ) in the low volume period and should fall when volume 
rises. This contradicts both the conclusion reached by Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and the 
assertions of empiricists drawing on their work. We adopt the expectation of a negative 
relationship between volume and volatility in the hypotheses below. 
 
This  negative  volume-volatility  prediction  is  controversial.  It  goes  beyond  just  re-
interpreting Admati and Pfleiderer (1988). It rejects the volume-volatility predictions of 
Copeland (1976) and Jennings et al (1981). However, the central point of those two papers 
was to show that sequential information arrival encompasses volume (= order flow) in the 
same direction as the price change, as part of the change process. This compares with the 
alternative tâtonnement process which requires no volume in order to revise price. Neither 
paper gives any consideration to how a future price innovation would be affected by having 
information about it released early, which is the key to our argument. The negative volume-
volatility conclusion has another important implication. It implies that informed trading is 
not the additional source of exogenous volatility that French and Roll (1986) had argued. 
Instead,  it  suggests  that  informed  trading  serves  to  reduce  exogenous  volatility  by 
dispersing and mixing price reactions to news.  
 
The Easley and O’Hara (1992) theory poses no opposition to the negative volume-volatility 
prediction. Their main conclusion on the relationship between volume and price changes is 
that, in the absence of informed trading and unusual volumes, price change is equal to  W. 
However,  unusual  volume,  whether  motivated  by  information  or  not, will  disturb  price   15 
changes. They further show that price will move in the direction of whichever quote is hit. 
So, if an informed trader finds out that the next price innovation is downwards and initiates 
a sell order now, the current price will be driven down by his order flow. This will close the 
gap between the price now and that predicted at the end of the next trading period, reducing 
the price change, as predicted above.  
 
It is clear from the preceding paragraphs that order flow,  , is a very important factor in 
determining both price changes and price change volatility. As a result we include intraday 
order flow in this investigation. Taking a lead from Hartmann (1998), we utilise an order 
flow  volatility  measure.  The  volatility  measure  of  order  flow  has  the  benefit  of  neatly 
getting around the signed order flow problem in order driven markets that was identified 
earlier. The most obvious question is, how should order flow volatility and price change 
volatility  be  related?  As  Figure  1  shows LI  LV FRUUHFWO\ DQWLFLSDWHG WKH UHODWLRQVKLS
between order flow and price change depends solely on the average information content of 
the price signal. As the above discussion shows, the relationship between their variances is 
similarly dependent on this information content. However, since information is assumed to 
FDUU\DIL[HGFRVW VKRXOGEHDEVHQWZKHQ LVKLJKLHZKHQYROXPHLVORZ,QWKH
Admati  and  Pfleiderer  (1988)  framework,  order  flow  is  the  result  of  informed  trading 
activity and so order flow volatility is positively linked to volume.  
 
In the process of trying to reconcile the conclusions of the various theoretical papers with 
each other, a deep-rooted apparent inconsistency came to light. This time it was between the 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), and Easley and O’Hara (1992) and relates to their respective 
conclusions on the bid-ask spread-volume relationship. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) state 
that bid-ask spreads should fall as volume rises, partly because much of the volume increase 
will be uninformed and partly because informed traders compete with each other. Easley 
and O’Hara (1992) say that bid-ask spreads should rise as volume rises because volume is 
inversely related to the number of no-trade events. The last point appears tautological but it 
is not. It says that if there is no volume, there can not be any informed volume. Hence, 
market makers can not be adversely selected. Conversely, adverse selection risk must rise 
linearly with volume. Adapting Easley and O’Hara (1992) to the intraday case means that 
the excess or absence of volume, relative to what is normal at that time of day, indicates the 
strength or weakness of a price signal. Therefore, bid-ask spreads should rise when volume 
is relatively high and fall when it is relatively low.    16 
 
The Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) framework does not cater for this kind of variation in the 
price signal. Their focus is purely on when traders should choose to dispatch trades, given 
inter-temporal bid-ask spreads and constantly available price signals. The conflict can be 
resolved, while preserving the insights of both models, by recasting volume into two parts, 
expected and unexpected. This refinement means that market makers should now narrow 
their bid-ask spreads in high volume periods partly because they expect a high number of 
informed  traders.  But  competition  among  these  informed  traders  erodes  the  adverse 
selection  risk that each one would pose  if acting alone. To put it another way, market 
makers  find  informed  traders  more  tolerable  in  high  volume  periods  because  they  are 
accompanied by high uninformed volumes and competition among informed traders makes 
their order flow less damaging. Now, in both high and low volume regimes, where trading 
deviates from the expected level, variations in the price signal can be inferred and bid-ask 
spreads can widen or narrow as Easley and O’Hara (1992) predict. A hypothesised negative 
relationship between bid-ask spreads and expected volume supports Admati and Pfleiderer 
(1988). The Easley and O’Hara (1992) expectation is manifested in the hypothesis that bid-
ask spreads and unexpected volume are positively related. Expected volume and unexpected 
volume should be unrelated to each other. 
 
In order to preserve the relationships established previously within a coherent structure, it is 
also necessary to split order flow volatility into expected and unexpected. Expected order 
flow volatility should be closely and positively aligned with expected volume, since order 
flow should be highest during high volume periods. These two should be negatively related 
to price change volatility. This follows directly from the discussion of the volume-volatility 
relationship  above,  since  the  Admati  and  Pfleiderer  (1988)  model  did  not  allow  for 
variations in the price signal. Since the latter do occur in actual data, the expected value is 
more  appropriate  for  testing  this  model.  Like  expected  volume,  expected  order  flow 
volatility should be negatively related to bid-ask spreads. This is because, according to 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), market makers find order flow more tolerable in high volume 
periods because it accompanies high uninformed volumes and competition among informed 
traders makes this order flow less damaging. Unexpected order flow volatility and expected 
order flow volatility should be unrelated to each other. 
   17 
Both  unexpected  volume  and  unexpected  order  flow  volatility  are  believed  to  capture 
deviations in the relative participation rate of informed traders and should be closely and 
positive aligned with each other. In some market microstructure models (e.g. Diamond and 
Verrecchia  (1987)),  the  absence  of  informed  trading  activity  is  perceived  as  bad  news 
because  of  restrictions  on  short  selling.  The  latter  does  not  apply  here.  Short  selling 
restrictions are not believed to be a problem in the spot FX market. Therefore, in the present 
analysis, the level of both unexpected volume and unexpected order flow volatility are seen 
as  indicative  of  the  strength  of  the  price  signal.  Since  both  unexpected  volume  and 
unexpected order flow volatility represent abnormal adverse selection risk, both should be 
positively linked to bid-ask spreads. 
 
Unexpected order flow should increase price change volatility. This is because the former is 
inversely  related  to  the  latter  by  the YDOXH RI  GHWHUPLQHG E\ H[SHFWHG RUGHU IORZ
Therefore, its impact on price change is larger when it rises and smaller when it falls. The 
association between unexpected order flow and unexpected volume means that the latter 
should also increase price change volatility as it rises. 
 
This synthesis of the Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Easley and O’Hara (1992) models 
predicts that bid-ask spreads should be positively related to price change volatility. This 
follows because both are expected to fall as expected volume and expected order flow rise. 
Similarly, both are expected to rise in response to increases in unexpected volume and 
unexpected  order  flow  volatility.  The  predicted  bid-ask  spread-price  change  volatility 
relationship also accords with intuition, as one expects the bid-ask spread to widen when the 
level of price change becomes more volatile. 
 
As alluded to at the beginning of this section, the primary purpose of the set of hypotheses 
below  is  to  explore  the  relationship  between  bid-ask  spreads/price  innovations  and  the 
timing  of  informed  and  uninformed  trading  decisions.  While  bid-ask  spreads  and  price 
changes may be measured directly, trading volume can not easily be split into informed and 
uninformed.  However,  a  number  of  variables  that  are  closely  associated  with  informed 
trading activity are directly measurable. These are: unexpected volume, expected order flow 
volatility and unexpected order flow volatility. Drawing from Easley and O’Hara (1992), 
unexpected volume depicts informed trading by encapsulating both its presence (positive 
values)  and  its  absence  (negative  values).  Expected  order  flow  volatility  illustrates  the   18 
normal level of informed trading. Like unexpected volume, unexpected order flow volatility 
encapsulates both the presence and absence of informed trading. Expected and unexpected 
informed  trading  both  contribute  to  the  level  of  price  change  volatility.  The  remaining 
variable, expected volume, comprises trading from both informed and uninformed traders. 
The  relationships  between  all  six  variables  implied  by  the  theory  above  are  now 
encapsulated in the following fifteen hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The bid-ask spread is positively related to unexpected order flow volatility 
Hypothesis 2: The bid-ask spread is negatively related to expected order flow volatility 
Hypothesis 3: The bid-ask spread is positively related to unexpected volume 
Hypothesis 4: The bid-ask spread is negatively related to expected volume 
Hypothesis 5: The bid-ask spread is positively related to price change volatility 
Hypothesis 6: Price change volatility is positively related to unexpected order flow volatility 
Hypothesis 7: Price change volatility is negatively related to expected order flow volatility 
Hypothesis 8: Price change volatility is positively related to unexpected volume  
Hypothesis 9: Price change volatility is negatively related to expected volume 
Hypothesis 10: Expected volume is not related to unexpected order flow volatility 
Hypothesis 11: Expected volume is positively related to expected order flow volatility 
Hypothesis 12: Expected volume is not related to unexpected volume (should hold by construction) 
Hypothesis 13: Unexpected volume is positively related to unexpected order flow volatility 
Hypothesis 14: Unexpected volume is not related to expected order flow volatility 
Hypothesis 15: Unexpected order flow volatility is not related to expected order flow volatility 
(should hold by construction) 
 
A correlation matrix representation (see below) is used to present the results for various 
exchange  rates.  The  objective  here  is  to  examine  empirical  evidence  to  test  the  above 
hypotheses.  The  correlation  matrix approach  side-steps  the  whole  issue  of  causality.  In 
addition, the matrix method enables us to evaluate all elements in this lattice of hypotheses 
simultaneously. If a particular relationship does not conform to that hypothesised, there are 
three possible explanations. First, a variable may be a poor proxy for the trading behaviour 
it  is  supposed  to  be  linked  with.  The  magnitude  of  the  correlation  between  the  three 
variables supposedly linked with informed trading will hopefully expose any rogue proxies 
for that variable. Second, the underlying behavioural premise that the theory projects may 
be flawed. Third, a pair of variables may be driven by an external factor in such a way that 
their natural relationship is overwhelmed. The pattern of relationships in the correlation   19 
matrix should help to explain the evidence. We only explore concurrent behaviour and not 
leading or lagging relationships, since this is what the above theory addresses. We compare 
the cases pre and post EMU to explore if and how these relationships have changed. 
       
                    UO  EO  UV  EV  RV   
            BA     +      -     +      -     + 
            RV     +      -     +      -           
            EV     0      +     0*               
            UV     +     0         
            EO     0*            
 
Key: BA – Bid-ask spread, RV – Return (Price Change) Volatility, EV – Expected Volume, 
UV – Unexpected Volume, EO – Expected Order Flow Volatility, and UO – Unexpected 
Order Flow Volatility. * - should hold by construction 
 
4  Data and Methodology 
The data used for the empirical analysis are 5-minute observations sampled from a large 
spot  FX  tick  database  provided  by  EBS.  This  dataset  has  not  previously  been  made 
available to academic researchers. It contains quote and trade price data for eight currency 
pairs from the EBS electronic inter-dealer market. The quotes data comprises the best bid 
and ask quote prices per second. Trade data is also time-stamped to the nearest second. No 
information about the size of each transaction is provided. The data consist of two sample 
periods with five exchange rates. The first covers 01/08/98 to 04/09/98 and consists of the 
currency pairs USD/DEM, USD/JPY, USD/CHF, DEM/JPY and DEM/CHF. The second 
covers  01/08/99  to  03/09/99  and  contains  data  on  EUR/USD,  USD/JPY,  USD/CHF, 
EUR/JPY and EUR/CHF. Each sample contains 20 days of observations. In this study, the 
EUR is taken to be the linear successor to the DEM on the grounds that, pre-EMU, the 
DEM was a pan-European vehicle currency (see Hartmann (1998)). 
 
We chose to use 5-minute samples for four reasons. First, because some instruments are less 
heavily  traded,  5-minute  intervals  capture  a  good  representation  from  all  instruments. 
Second, there is so much data for some instruments that it necessary to condense it in some 
way in order to extract meaningful insights. Third, data which is evenly spaced in time   20 
makes it easier to use conventional time series methods. Fourth, the 5-minute interval is 
used in many previous empirical research papers. A correlation value is computed for each 
pair of factors sampled at 5-minute intervals, over the full length of each sample period. 
Each correlation coefficient uses around 7,000 observations. Hypotheses involving the bid-
ask spread and order flow require quotes data, and 5 exchange rates have sufficient liquidity 
to  be  used  in  this  analysis:  USD/JPY,  USD/CHF,  EUR(DEM)/USD,  EUR(DEM)/JPY, 
EUR(DEM)/CHF.  
 
The bid-ask spread and price change volatility are both calculated using the difference in 
log prices (e.g. see Buckle et al (1998)). Bid-ask spreads use the last bid and ask prices, 
from series of best quote prices, in each 5-minute interval. Price change is calculated using 
the last trade prices in the interval. For testing, the absolute value of price change is used as 
a  proxy  for  price  change  volatility,  which  is  consistent  with  the  method  proposed  by 
Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Labys (2001). The other four variables, expected and 
unexpected order flow, and expected and unexpected volume are in units of the number of 
individual spot FX transactions. The expected and unexpected components are derived from 
the total order flow and total volume series respectively. Total volume comprises the total 
sell volume over the interval plus the total buy volume. Total order flow is arrived at by 
subtracting the total buy from the total sell volumes. Similar to price change, the absolute 
value of this total order flow is used as a proxy for order flow volatility in time series 
analysis. Since EBS do not provide volume data, the number of trades is used as a proxy. 
Fortunately, EBS do provide the side of each trade. 
 
In low frequency empirical analysis, expected volume is often derived using an ARIMA 
model (e.g. Hartmann (1998), Bessembinder (1994), Jorion (1996)). However, we follow an 
alternative approach, pioneered by Danielsson and Payne (2001). They found that using the 
repetitive intraday volume pattern directly, which is measured as the across-day average of 
volume for each time segment, worked at least as well for high frequency intraday FX data. 
Unexpected  volume  is  calculated  as  the  difference  between  the  actual  volume  and  this 
expected measure. Similarly, expected order flow volatility is computed as the across-day 
standard deviation of order flow per time segment. Unexpected order flow volatility is the 
difference between the absolute value of actual order flow and the aforementioned expected 
measure. It is important to note that both unexpected variables will contain both positive 
and negative numbers and that, for each time segment, their across-day averages will sum to   21 
zero. For this reason, neither of the “unexpected” variables is depicted in the figures below. 
Formally, the variables are defined as follows: 
 
, , , , , , , , , , , , log( ) log( ) i d t i d t i d t s a b x e x e x e = -  
Equation 6: Bid-ask spread 
 
, , , , , , , , , , , , 1 i d t i d t i d t r p p x e x e x e - = -  
Equation 7: Return Volatility 
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Equation 8: Expected Volume 
 
, , , , , , , , , , , i d t i d t i t UV V EV x e x e x e = -  
Equation 9: Unexpected Volume 
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Equation 10: Expected Order Flow Volatility 
 
, , , , , , , , , , , i d t i d t i t UO O EO x e x e x e = -  
Equation 11: Unexpected Order Flow Volatility 
 
In these equations, the measures are shown with five subscripts, i which represents the 
instrument,   which denotes the regime,   which indicates pre-EMU or post-EMU, d which 
represents the day and t which represents the time of day (to 5-minute accuracy). 
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5.  Empirical Results 
The intraday patterns for the above variables, for pre-EMU and post-EMU periods, are 
shown  in  Figures  5  to  24.  The  purpose  of  these  is  to  present  the  pattern  of  activity 
throughout the day and to directly compare the pre-EMU and post-EMU periods. In all 
cases, the Y-axis intersects the X-axis at 0. The X-axis shows time of day in GMT. The 
intraday data spans 24-hours, since spot FX is a global business.  
 
The M-shape pattern previously documented by other FX researchers is clear in the volume 
and volatility figures. It is also evident in the order flow volatility figures. The bid-ask 
spreads display a U-shaped dip during the heavy trading part of the day, i.e. when London 
or  New  York  are  active.  The  general  fall  in  volume,  return  volatility  and  order  flow 
volatility, and a rise in bid-ask spreads in 1999 over 1998 is revealed in intraday detail. 
USD/CHF did not conform to this pattern of change. For EUR(DEM)/CHF, everything is 
lower in 1999, although the bid-ask spread has fallen less than the other variables. 
 
Tables  1  to  10  present  the  correlation  matrices,  where  the  evidence  generally  provides 
strong  support  for  the  hypotheses  laid  out  above.  However,  the  most  contentious 
hypotheses, concerning the relationship between volume and volatility are overwhelmingly 
rejected. It is clear from visual comparison of the intraday average patterns that expected 
volume  and  price  change  volatility  are  strongly  positively  correlated.  The  correlation 
matrices  confirm  this  and  reveal  further  that  unexpected  volume  has  an  even  stronger 
positive link to price change volatility. While this finding is broadly in line with previous 
empirical findings, it flatly contradicts the negative volume-volatility relationship implied 
by the Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) framework that we demonstrated above.  
 
A strong negative relationship between bid-ask spreads and volume is evident in the charts. 
The correlation matrices reveal that expected volume is significantly negatively correlated 
with bid-ask spreads, confirming the asserted relationship by Admati and Pfleiderer (1988). 
Contrary to the expectations of Easley and O’Hara (1992), the correlation matrices show 
that the link between bid-ask spreads and unexpected volume is very weak in these markets. 
All but one of the correlation matrices exhibit the expected positive sign for the relationship 
between bid-ask spreads and volatility. However, all these values are low and no strong link 
is discernable.   23 
 
The expected relationship between order flow and volume is strongly confirmed in the data. 
Expected order flow volatility is very highly correlated with expected volume, which is 
consistent  with  the  notion  that  informed  traders  choose  to  trade  at  the  same  time  as 
uninformed traders, as Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) conjectured. However, the graphs also 
clearly show that order flow is not dormant in the low volume period. The relationship 
between the unexpected components is weaker than that of the expected components but is 
still positive and far from insubstantial, which indicates that order flow is not the only 
source of unexpected volume. There are four permutations whereby an expected part of 
either volume or order flow volatility could be correlated with the unexpected part of either 
itself or the other. As predicted, all four cross-correlations were found to have coefficients 
of zero for every instrument and sample period. 
 
There is strong evidence from the spot FX market to support 10 of the 15 hypotheses (2, 4, 
6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15), weak evidence or no relationship in 3 cases (1, 3 and 5) and 
strong contrary evidence in 2 cases (7 and 9). In all cases, visual comparison of the charts 
validates the numerical findings in the correlation matrices. 
 
The positive relationship observed between volume and return volatility raises a serious 
question about the ability of private information based models to completely explain the 
observed  intraday  patterns.  However,  it  should  be  remembered  that  the  central  model 
considered here, Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), contains an implicit assumption that the 
variance of the price innovation is constant. If relevant macroeconomic and company news 
were more likely to occur during trading hours, then this assumption would not hold. In that 
case, perhaps a combined model based on flow-of-news and private information might fare 
better.  However,  even  then,  there  are  two  pieces  of  evidence  which  suggests  that  this 
answer  falls  short.  The  first  is  the  empirical  evidence  investigated  by  French  and  Roll 
(1986).  These  data  included  days  where  the  market  experienced  unscheduled  closures. 
There is no reason to believe that the amount of news was any less but volatility proved 
much lower than the open market data led one to expect. The same point applies to Ito et 
al’s (1998)  application of  French and Roll’s (1986) model to  the  spot FX market. The 
second piece of contrary evidence is contained in the intraday patterns, which show how 
price change volatility and order flow volatility closely follow the peaks and troughs of 
volume over the trading day. The USD/JPY is particularly telling. After Tokyo closes and   24 
before New York opens, a large volume of London trading can be discerned. These are 
average amounts of trading over August (1998 and 1999) at this time of day. It is hard to 
believe that much news important for the USD/JPY occurs during this period. Yet, return 
volatility and order flow volatility are shown to remain high during this period. This shows 
that the magnitude of price change seems closely aligned with order flow and with volume, 
even when these occur at times when relevant news is unlikely to be released. 
 
This  close  association  between  volume  and  return  volatility  fits  particularly  well  with 
Clark’s (1973) original MDH model, in which volatility in daily price change is composed 
of  n  successive  individual  price  change  increments  within  the  day,  and  increases  as  n 
increases.  The  number  of  trades,  n,  is  interpreted  as  a  proxy  for  volume.  Admati  and 
Pfleiderer’s (1988) negative relationship between volume and bid-ask spreads is still widely 
supported in the correlations and in the 24-hour spot FX intra-day patterns. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
The  finding  that  order  flow  and  return  volatility  are  strongly  positively  correlated 
undermines private information as the dominant explanation of observed intraday patterns 
and  relationships.  If  order  flow  is  driven  by  information  then  order-flow  volatility  and 
return volatility should be negatively correlated. High levels of order flow should erode 
return by breaking up the price impact of an individual news event and merging it with 
offsetting price impact from uncorrelated news events. This lowers the average absolute 
return and so also lowers variance. This order flow erosion insight contradicts the French 
and Roll (1986) conclusion, as well as that of Ito et al (1998) for the FX case, that the cause 
of observed excess volatility during normal trading hours must be private information.  
 
The  pattern  of  intraday  order  flow  volatility,  a  variable  hitherto  unaddressed  in  the 
literature, is revealed to closely track the intraday pattern of volume. Previous empirical 
research had only linked order flow to price determination and path dependence. Our work 
reveals  order  flow’s  relationship  with  bid-ask  spreads  and  return  volatility,  as  well  as 
volume, in the context of the spot FX market.  
 
One of our most important findings is that there was no empirical evidence to support 
Easley and O’Hara’s (1992) prediction that the bid-ask spread and unanticipated volume   25 
should be positively correlated. This implies either that unanticipated volume arises from 
something other than information events, or that bid-ask spreads in this market do not widen 
in  response  increased  adverse  selection  risk.  However,  militating  against  the  latter 
conclusion is that empirical evidence supports a central assertion of Admati and Pfleiderer 
(1988): that expected volume and bid-ask spreads are inversely related. The bid-ask spread 
does indeed narrow when volume rises. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) say that this happens 
because adverse selection risk is higher in low volume periods.  
 
If this is true, then we must look to sources other than private information as the stimuli for 
the observed unanticipated volumes. Existing microstructure theory considers only one rival 
force to private information as capable of creating order flow, namely inventory. This is 
normally defined as a temporary imbalance between supply and demand which a market 
maker is willing to hold for a short period. However, a prominent role for inventory does 
not make much sense given the structure of the EBS spot FX inter-dealer market. There is 
no evidence that any market participant in this market acts as a market-maker supplying 
liquidity to the other participants. No participant in this market is required to supply two-
way  prices.  Bid-ask  spreads  are  very  small  as  a  percentage  of  deal  value.  The  main 
motivation  for  dealing  on  the  inter-dealer  market  is  to  acquire  or  dispose  of  inventory 
arising from client deals. The bid-ask spreads on client deals are much wider than those in 
the inter-dealer market. 
 
Buyers and sellers with different motives and/or different views co-exist in the market at the 
same time. Garman’s (1976) seminal paper on order flow permitted demand and supply 
probability distributions to be identical but independent. This assumption would allow both 
volume and order flow to appear lumpy. However, this explanation does not obviate the 
need for each inventory increment to demand a price concession in order to be absorbed by 
the  market.  This  simple  argument  could  account  for  the  observed  positive  order  flow 
volatility-return  volatility  relationship.  In  addition,  it  is  consistent  with  Clark’s  (1973) 
MDH.  Combined,  these  two  explanations  appear  to  go  a  considerable  way  towards 
explaining the puzzle of why exchange rates are excessively volatile. 
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Figure 3: Price adjusts to alternate good and bad news events 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Informed trading disperses and mixes price reactions to news 
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